

ANDOCIDES AND HELLANICUS

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The thesis of this paper is that Andocides derived the material for his excursus on Athenian history in the *De pace* (3–9) from the *Atthis* of Hellanicus.

Andocides delivered this speech in support of a treaty which he had helped arrange with Sparta to end the Corinthian War. In order to counteract charges that the agreement with Lysander in 404 had resulted in disaster for Athens, Andocides gives a brief resumé of Athenian-Spartan relations from the ostracism of Cimon to the end of the Peloponnesian War, placing special emphasis on the benefits which Athens reaped from its periods of peace with Sparta. It is generally held that this account is riddled with errors.¹ In fact, the excursus is, on the surface at least, so muddled that almost no one has ever taken it seriously. As a result, little effort has been made to determine Andocides' source or sources.²

¹ Cf. R. C. Jebb, *The Attic Orators from Antiphon to Isaeus* 1 (London 1893) 127–29; K. J. Maidment, *Minor Attic Orators* 1 (Cambridge, Mass., 1941) 500–5; Umberto Albini, *Andocide: De Pace* (Firenze 1964) 17–18.

² Georges Mathieu attempts to show that Andocides was using a political pamphlet of the faction of Theramenes; cf. his article, "Survivances des luttes politiques du V^e siècle chez les orateurs attiques du IV^e siècle," *RevPhil* 38 (1914) 190–94. It has also been suggested to me that Andocides' source might have been a rhetorical, rather than a political, handbook. Both suggestions derive from the hypothesis that both Andocides and Aeschines (*De falsa legatione* 172–76) derive their accounts of Athenian history from a common source. However, the minor discrepancies between the two versions are easily explained, I think, by the usual view that Aeschines was simply paraphrasing Andocides, just as the many verbal similarities would indicate. The decisive evidence for the relationship between the two orators has been noted by Jebb (above, note 1) 130. Andocides naturally emphasizes the role of his grandfather in making the Thirty Years Peace (6), just as he does the influence of his uncle in making a treaty with Persia (29); but in Aeschines the importance given to Andocides' grandfather is completely out of place and indicates Aeschines' direct dependence on the *De pace*. In any event, Andocides' ultimate source would be the same whether he used an intermediary, such as a handbook, or not.

Much of the information which Andocides gives in his presentation, such as numbers of cavalry and amounts of money, is too detailed to come from memory. We should instead expect that Andocides consulted some documents or books to obtain these facts. Since historical research in the archives of Athens is simply not in character for Andocides, it is likely on *a priori* grounds that he derived much of his information for the *De pace* from a history book. As far as we know, the only such history in Andocides' day was the *Atthis* of Hellanicus.³

This work took the form of an annal. There were occasional digressions, such as an excursus on Andocides' own lineage (*FGrH* 323a F24), but in the main it seems to have been a chronicle of events listed according to archon-year, with little effort to provide the background for these events or to assess their significance.

Now if a person lacking any real knowledge of fifth century history were to search in such a compendium of facts for useful material to strengthen his case, he would be led to make certain kinds of errors. In the first place, he would seldom be able to place the facts which interested him in their proper historical perspective. Secondly, he would be unable to find any important facts which did not appear in the compendium. As we shall see, these are errors characteristic of Andocides.

The clearest example belongs to the second type of error and occurs because Hellanicus did not depart from his normal function as chronicler of events in order to give the background of a certain episode. Thucydides (2.13) gives a summary of Athenian resources at the beginning of the Peloponnesian War. If Andocides had read it, he would have learned that Athens had 6000 talents in silver coin plus much additional uncoined metal, an army of 29,000 hoplites, 1200 cavalry, and 1600 archers, and a fleet of 300 ships. Since almost all of this had been acquired since the Thirty Years Peace in 446, it would be powerful ammunition for Andocides' argument. Instead of using this material, however, he presents the benefits of the Thirty Years Truce as follows (5):

³ On Hellanicus cf. Felix Jacoby, *Atthis: The Local Chronicles of Ancient Athens* (Oxford 1949) 86-99.

We deposited 1000 talents on the Acropolis and passed a law that it could not be touched; we built an additional one hundred triremes, and voted to make them untouchable; we built dockyards, we established a force of 1200 cavalry and a like number of archers; and the Southern Long Wall was built.

His statements about the money and ships are correct, but they are only a small part of the story. They are derived from a notice of the decree which set aside the reserve of ships and money, which we know from Thucydides (2.24) was passed during the first months of the Peloponnesian War. From this notice Andocides (rightly) deduced that the money and ships had been acquired since 446. Yet his failure to use the more effective material in this argument shows that he had no personal knowledge of Athenian finance and depended on a source which omitted a systematic discussion of Athenian resources. This is precisely what we would expect of a chronicle such as the *Atthis* of Hellanicus.

The other examples which I shall cite belong to the first type of error, in which the reader of an annal cannot place events in their proper perspective. In his account of the Peace of Cimon, Andocides says that Athens fortified the Piraeus (5), while under the Thirty Years Peace he mentions the construction of dockyards (7). Since, however, we know that Themistocles fortified the Piraeus and built the dockyards, scholars have been quick to reject Andocides' version.⁴ On the other hand, we should notice that Andocides speaks of dockyards, without the article. Thus they are not *the* famous dockyards of Themistocles. Naturally, with the increase in the size of the Athenian fleet a need would arise for additional ship-sheds, and Isocrates (*Areopagiticus* 66) clearly indicates that large sums of money were actually spent on such construction during his lifetime.⁵ Nor would it be surprising if extensive work were done on the walls of the Piraeus, which had been hurriedly constructed on orders from Themistocles (Thuc. 1.93). The logical context for such work would be Hippodamus' construction in the Piraeus, which probably belongs to the period to which Andocides assigns the fortifications.⁶ Although

⁴ Maidment (above, note 1) 501-4, followed in part by Albini (above, note 1) 59.

⁵ IG 1² 91, line 31, provides for expenditures on the dockyards in 434/3.

⁶ As I shall argue, Andocides' source dated the Peace of Cimon from 458 to 446. Although the evidence for Hippodamus is scanty, his participation in the foundation of

Andocides, then, is partially or wholly correct on his facts, still he does not make it clear that he is talking of *additional* fortifications and *additional* dockyards and, thereby, he produces a false impression. One explanation of this is that he was merely lifting facts from a compendium which did not relate them to earlier developments.

A second group of statements deals with the number of ships and men raised by Athens. Andocides says that in the 450's "in place of the triremes which at that time were old and unseaworthy, the ones with which we defeated the Persians and liberated the Greeks, in place of these ships we constructed one hundred triremes." As Maidment remarks, "An obvious inaccuracy. The Athenian fleet had been growing steadily since the Persian Wars and the institution of the Delian League."⁷ In determining how Andocides could make so obvious an error, we must ask two questions: did Athens actually build 100 triremes during this period, and what was the reason for it? Although we lack actual evidence for answering the first question, there are three reasons to think that the Athenians may have undertaken a shipbuilding program during the 450's: first, they needed replacements for heavy losses in ships sustained during the Egyptian Expedition;⁸ secondly, extra ships would be desirable for Cimon's campaign to Cyprus; and, finally, it is likely that during this time many of the large cities in the Delian League were converting from supplying ships to paying money in order to satisfy their assessments.⁹ Athens would have to make up this deficiency in ships by supplying more of her own. So Andocides may be, and probably is, correct in his statement of fact. His opinion that these one hundred triremes were meant to replace the ships which had fought at Salamis is, of course, absurd, and anyone with a real grip on the historical situation would realize that Athens would replace its ships continually. But if a person with no real historical feeling or knowledge consulted a chronicle and found no mention of shipbuilding between Salamis and 450, he would

Thurii (Hesychius, s.v. *Ἰπποδάμου νέμῃσις*) would seem to indicate that his activities in the Piraeus occurred during Pericles' ascendancy.

⁷ Maidment (above, note 1) 502.

⁸ The losses were forty ships at the minimum and possibly much higher; cf. A. W. Gomme, *A Historical Commentary on Thucydides* 1 (Oxford 1945) 321-22.

⁹ B. D. Meritt, H. T. Wade-Gery, and M. F. McGregor, *The Athenian Tribute Lists* 3 (Princeton 1950) 244-64.

simply assume *ex silentio* that Athens continued to use the ships that had won at Salamis. Thus, the easiest way to understand Andocides' treatment of these ships is to take it as his interpretation of a bald statement of fact that Athens built (or voted to build) 100 ships.

Again he says that in the 450's Athens for the first time established a cavalry force of 300 men. Let us agree with the critics right away that Athens had cavalry before this date, but let us also note that Gomme and Busolt have interpreted Andocides' remark to mean this was the first *regular* corps of cavalry.¹⁰ Previously the cavalry may have been a group of young aristocrats of no significance, but it was not until the 450's that a formal organization was created. So once again we can understand Andocides' remark as the result of his picking out a fact without placing it in its historical perspective. Likewise his statement that during this same period 300 Scythian archers were hired ignores the previous development of the Athenian archery force.

Finally, Andocides' statement that during the Peace of Nicias Athens deposited 7000 talents on the Acropolis must be considered. The editors of the *Athenian Tribute Lists* have shown that this is extremely unlikely to be true.¹¹ Noting, on the other hand, that 7000 talents is just about the total owed to Athena and the Other Gods at the end of the Archidamian War, they conclude that Andocides knew of a decree calling for repayment of this sum and that he took the intention for the accomplishment. If this attractive explanation is correct, such a confusion would not be possible for someone who had personal knowledge of Athenian finance. So I would say, not that Andocides *knew of* such a decree, but that he found such a decree. Unless we are to conceive of Andocides examining decrees and treasure records on the Acropolis, we are left with the alternative that he derived his information about the 7000 talents at second hand from a book, such as the *Atthis*.

Perhaps one or two of these examples came from Andocides' memory, but the weight of all of them together strongly favors the

¹⁰ Gomme (above, note 8) 328; Georg Busolt and Heinrich Swoboda, *Griechische Staatskunde* (Munich 1926) 824, note 1.

¹¹ Meritt, Wade-Gery, and McGregor (above, note 9) 346-58.

hypothesis of a documentary source, in general, and of a chronicle, in particular.¹²

One last piece of evidence in favor of this hypothesis is the historical chronology adopted in the speech. Andocides lists a series of wars between Athens and Sparta along with the treaties which ended them. Of all the errors in the speech, this catalog has produced the most caustic comments from the critics.¹³ Instead of the bludgeon, however, we should apply here the scalpel, for with minor surgery Andocides' catalog makes perfectly good sense. Here is the list as it stands:

- 1A. War in Euboea
- 1B. Peace of Miltiades (the son of Cimon) to last for five years
- 2A. War because of Aegina
- 2B. Peace of Andocides (the orator's grandfather) to last for thirty years
- 3A. War on account of Megara (i.e. Archidamian War)
- 3B. Peace of Nicias
- 4A. War resulting from Athenian-Argive provocations (i.e. Decelean War)
- 4B. Agreement by which Athens lost its walls and fleet

Aside from correcting 1B to read Peace of Cimon (the son of Miltiades), we need only exchange 1A for 2A. The war fought over Aegina is what we call the First Peloponnesian War, while 1A is the revolt of Euboea in 446. The latter conflict was ended by a thirty year truce,¹⁴ just as Andocides says, while we know from several sources that Cimon ended the First Peloponnesian War with a five year truce.¹⁵ With these corrections made, Andocides will be saying that Athens made a five year truce and remained at peace with Sparta for thirteen years. Since the revolt of Euboea broke out in 446, he would then be dating the Peace of Cimon to 458/7. Whether he is right or

¹² It also appears obvious that the statement that Athens once possessed Megara, Pegai, and Troizen (3) is derived from the terms of the Thirty Years Truce (Thuc. 1.115). Once again it seems likely to me that he did not simply *know* these terms, but rather that he came upon them in the course of preparing his speech.

¹³ Cf. Maidment (above, note 1) 500-3 and Jebb (above, note 1) 127-29.

¹⁴ Thuc. 1.115; Diod. 12.7; Plutarch, *Per.* 24; Aristodemus 15; Pausanias 5.23.4; Justin 3.7.

¹⁵ Cf. Diod. 11.86; Theopompus, Fr. 88; Thuc. 1.112; Plutarch, *Cimon* 18 and *Per.* 10; Nepos, *Cimon* 3. (The manuscripts of Andocides give the length of the Peace as five years; those of Aeschines, fifty years [*De falsa legatione* 172]. I would suggest that Aeschines or a copyist purposely altered the numeral, since he could not understand how one could remain thirteen years in a five year truce.)

wrong about this date does not really matter in this discussion. What is important is that this date agrees with the chronology adopted by Theopompus (Fr. 88) and is thus representative of one ancient tradition.¹⁶ What is the source of this thirteen year gap between the Peace of Cimon and the Revolt of Euboea? Did Andocides and other people know that the Peace of Cimon lasted thirteen years, or is this something that a chronographer worked out? To me the latter is far more probable, and, barring any independent work by Andocides along this line, the only one who could have done it is Hellanicus.

A similar case is Andocides' date for the Northern Long Wall, which was built ca. 457 (Thuc. 1.108.3). Andocides places its completion *after* the Peace of Cimon (5). Although this is wrong according to our date for the Peace (451/0), it is at least consistent with his own date. Was Andocides just lucky that two of his "errors," his dates for the Peace and for the Long Wall, canceled each other? On the contrary, this internal consistency seems to me to be the product of a serious effort to order the events of the Pentekontaetia in a chronological sequence. Hellanicus is the man who first made such an effort.

These, then, are the reasons for believing that Andocides derived his material from the *Atthis* of Hellanicus. The strongest objection to this view, of course, is that by using the work of a serious antiquarian Andocides could not have produced such a jumble of misinformation. To answer this argument we need to show that Andocides' account is not really so confused and erroneous as scholars have imagined. We have already seen that some of Andocides' supposed "howlers" may very well be statements of truth misunderstood by the critics themselves, such as his remarks on the institution of the cavalry, the fortification of the Piraeus, and the building of dockyards. Again, some of his actual errors are quite minimal and may simply result from imperfect digestion of his reading, such as the confusion of Cimon's name and the names of the Aeginetan and Euboean Wars. And, finally, some

¹⁶ Philochorus (Fr. 34) dates the two Sacred Wars three years apart. All the chronological problems which this causes (cf. Gomme [above, note 8] 409) would disappear if Philochorus were following the same system as Andocides and Theopompus, for there would be plenty of room between 458/7 and 446/5 for the Sacred Wars, the Cyprus campaign, and the revolt of Boeotia.

of the errors, rather than showing that Andocides had no reliable source, tend to show the opposite—he had a reliable source but did not know what to do with it—such as his statements about the replacement of the ships of Salamis and the deposit of 7000 talents on the Acropolis during the Peace of Nicias.